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KEBERKESANAN ULANGKAJI KOD TADBIR URUS KORPORAT: 
BUKTI-BUKTI ANTARABANGSA 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 Dalam kesusasteraan, terdapat bukti-bukti terhad untuk menunjukkan 
keberkesanan ulangkaji kod tadbir urus korporat yang dilancarkan berterusan sejak 
awal. Dengan menggunakan data firma daripada 35 buah negara, kajian ini mendapati 
ulangkaji kod tadbir urus korporat yang berterusan mempengaruhi hubungan antara 
skor tadbir urus korporat and nilai firma dengan bersignifikan. Didapati kebanyakan 
negara yang terpilih dalam kajian ini telah menjalankan lebih daripada sekali ulangkaji 
kod tadbir urus disebabkan penggunaan data panel yang melingkungi tahun dari 2007 
hingga 2014. Kajian ini menganalisasi ulangkaji kod tadbir urus korporat daripada tiga 
sudut pandangan, iaitu bilangan kumulasi ulangkaji kod tadbir urus, bilangan amalan 
baru yang diterbitkan pada ulangkaji tersebut, dan bilangan tahun untuk mematuhi 
amalan baru tersebut. Ujian tambahan dilakukan terhadap model regresi utama dengan 
membahagikan tadbir urus korporat kepada empat unsur, iaitu fungsi lembaga 
pengarah, struktur lembaga pengarah, polisi pampasan dan perlindungan hak 
pemegang saham. Ujian sensitif dijalankan dengan mengkaji kesan prestasi ekonomi 
negara, kualiti tadbir urus institusi, krisis kewangan 2008, bias pemilihan sampel, 
pengaruh regim ulangkaji kod tadbir urus, dan penggunaan pembolehubah bersandar 
alternatif terhadap keputusan utama yang didapati. Ujian keteguhan dijalankan dengan 
mengkaji kesan-kesan daripada tahap asal tadbir urus korporat dan tekanan pasaran 
modal terhadap keberkesanan ulangkaji kod tadbir urus. Lagi, keberkesanan ulangkaji 
kod tadbir urus di negara-negara telah membangun dan negara-negara sedang 
membangun dikaji secara berasingan. Keputusan utama kajian ini menunjukkan 
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bahawa bilangan kumulasi ulangkaji kod tadbir urus korporat memberi kesan positif 
yang signifikan terhadap hubungan antara skor tadbir urus korporat dan nilai firma. 
Peningkatan bilangan amalan baru tadbir urus korporat yang disebarkan daripada 
ulangkaji kod memberi kesan negatif yang signifikan kepada hubungan tersebut. 
Peninggian bilangan tahun untuk mematuhi amalan baru tadbir urus korporat 
merosotkan kesan negatif yang disebabkan oleh peningkatan bilangan amalam baru 
tadbir urus korporat. Keputusan ujian tambahan menunjukkan bahawa, kesan positif 
peningkatan kumulasi bilangan ulangkaji kod tadbir urus dipaparkan pada peningkatan 
skor fungsi lembaga pengarah, skor struktur lembaga pengarah, dan skor polisi 
pampasan. Kesan negatif peningkatan bilangan amalan baru tadbir urus korporat 
daripada ulangkaji kod dipaparkan pada amalan baru di bidang fungsi lembaga 
pengarah sahaja. Sebaliknya, peningkatan bilangan amalan baru di bidang struktur 
lembaga pengarah pada tahap sederhana memberi kesan positif yang signifikan kepada 
hubungan antara skor tadbir urus korporat dan nilai firma. Kesemua keputusan didapati 
tidak dipengaruhi oleh faktor-faktor yang dikaji di ujian sensitif. Keputusan daripada 
ujian keteguhan menunjukkan bahawa tahap asal tadbir urus korporat dan tekanan 
pasaran modal boleh menjejaskan penemuan utama kajian ini. Akhirnya, kajian ini 
mendapati penemuan utama kajian ini berdekatan dengan keputusan yang didapati 
dengan hanya menggunakan sampel daripada negara-negara telah membangun. 
Kesimpulannya, keputusan-keputusan kajian ini memberi implikasi dasar yang 
berguna kepada pembangunan kod tadbir urus korporat, dan juga menambahkan 
pandangan baru kepada teori-teori dalam kesusasteraan.  
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 
REVISIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The literature lacks empirical evidence to show the effectiveness of progressive 
revisions on the national codes of corporate governance. Using firm-level data from 
35 countries, this study shows that progressive corporate governance code revisions 
have significantly moderated the relationship between corporate governance score and 
firm value. Majority of the countries selected in this study has at least more than one 
code revision covered as the use of a panel data covering the years from 2007 to 2014. 
In detail, this study assesses corporate governance code revisions from three 
perspectives, i.e. the cumulative number of corporate governance code revisions, the 
number of new governance practices released in each revision, and the years of 
compliance with the codes. Additional tests are conducted by running the main 
regression model on four sub-aspects of corporate governance, i.e. board function, 
board structure, compensation policy and shareholder rights protection. Sensitivity 
tests are conducted to examine if the effects of countries’ economic performance, 
institutional governance quality, the 2008 financial crisis, sample selection bias, 
regime effect of corporate governance code revisions, and the alternative dependent 
variables are able to affect the main findings. Robustness tests regarding the influence 
of firms’ internal corporate governance standard in existence and the influence of 
capital market pressure to the effectiveness of corporate governance code revisions 
have been conducted. Also, the effectiveness of corporate governance code revisions 
in developed and developing countries are examined. This study shows that the 
cumulative number of corporate governance code revisions has a significant positive 
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moderating effect to the relationship with corporate governance score and firm value. 
Instead, increasing the number of new governance practices released from corporate 
governance code revisions has a significant negative moderating effect to the 
relationship. The negative moderating effect is deteriorated following the increased 
years of compliance with the codes of corporate governance. The additional tests 
reveal that, the positive moderating effect brought by the cumulative number of 
corporate governance code revisions are driven by the improved board function score, 
board structure score, and compensation score. Meanwhile, the negative moderating 
effect brought by increasing the number of new governance practices is significantly 
driven by the increased new board function practices only. However, we find that, 
increasing the number of new board structure practices in a moderate level has a 
significant positive moderating effect to the relationship between corporate 
governance score and firm value. In sum, the findings are not influenced by all the 
other factors tested in the sensitivity tests. Robustness tests reveal that firms’ internal 
corporate governance standard in existence, and the capital market pressure have 
affected the main results of this study. Lastly, this study finds that the main results 
obtained in this study are further corroborated only when using the sample from 
developed countries only. In summary, the findings of this study have provided the 
useful policy implications to the corporate governance code development, and have 
added new theoretical insights to the body of knowledge in the related literature.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
International non-regulatory organizations such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Pan-European, Commonwealth, 
and International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) has shaped the world’s 
corporate governance by providing governments and regulators around the world with 
effective policy instruments in evaluating and strengthening the legal, regulatory and 
institutional framework of corporate governance of individual countries (Cuomo, 
Mallin and Zattoni, 2016). One of the important contribution of these organisations to 
the world’s corporate governance development is the release of the transnational codes 
and principles of corporate governance such as the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) Statement of 
Global Corporate Governance Principles which have provided important guidance to 
the development of the world’s corporate governance.  
The transnational codes and principles of corporate governance released 
provide a common corporate governance guidance to the publicly listed firms around 
the world. Gradually, as the compliance with the codes of corporate governance has 
become legitimized, the recommendations on corporate governance practices are more 
widely incorporated into the publicly listed firms around the world. However, due to 
the argument that the common corporate governance guidance provided by the 
transnational codes and principles of corporate governance is not a good fit to each 
country’s local institutional and organisation norms, it has been further modified by 
2 
 
the local policy makers. Thus, this has given rise to individual national codes of 
corporate governance. The code issuers of each country may be different, some may 
be the government, the stock exchange, or the professional associations. Nevertheless, 
all of the national codes share the similar objective, which is promoting good 
governance practices to the firms.  
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance acts as the popular common 
guidance to the world’s corporations in corporate governance. The Principles bears the 
responsibility of being the main reference point in guiding the development of the 
world’s corporate governance. In order to adapt to the changes in market structure, the 
dynamic market expectation on new governance practices, and the essence for keeping 
the corporations updated regarding the most appropriate practices of good governance, 
the Principles has been revised three times since the first issue in 1999. The latest 
revision of the Principles was conducted during the G20/OECD Corporate Governance 
Forum on 10th April 2015 at Istanbul, Turkey, and the finalized revision of Principles 
was then presented to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in 
September 2015 during a meeting (OECD, 2015).  
The revision of the transnational codes and principles of corporate governance 
may drive a major reform to the world’s corporate governance. The policy makers of 
individual country too, need to stay connect with the new governance practices by 
revising their national codes of corporate governance. Besides conforming to the new 
transnational codes, revision of the national codes of corporate governance may 
sometimes need to be revised even more, if local authorities find that the existing 
corporate governance guidance is ineffective or inappropriate to the local firms. 
Usually, surveys, forums, as well as discussion with experts may be carried out in the 
process of revising the national codes of corporate governance.  
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The effectiveness of corporate governance code revisions in individual country 
depends on how well the code issuers adapt the common guidance to the local 
institutional and organization norms. Local firms that blindly follow the common 
guidance might not reap any benefit from the practices. Instead, this action may 
backfire because complying with the inappropriate governance practices increases the 
cost of compliance borne by the firms. Based on this argument, it is therefore 
worthwhile to research on the effectiveness of corporate governance code revisions.   
 
1.2 Motivation of the Study 
The literature has shown that there is a significant relationship between 
corporate governance and firm value. According to agency theory, improving the 
standard of corporate governance can reduce the cost of agency, which will then 
increase firm value. A national code of corporate governance acts as an important 
guide to the firms’ corporate governance settings. In order to quickly advance the 
development of corporate governance, many regulatory and non-regulatory bodies 
such as the government, the stock exchange, and professional associations have taken 
the initiative to facilitate the development of the national code of corporate governance. 
These parties assist in many ways in revising the national code of corporate 
governance from time to time so that the firms are continuously updated with the best 
practices of governance. For example, in Malaysia, the Security Commission Malaysia 
released the first national code of corporate governance (namely the Malaysia Code of 
Corporate Governance) in 2000, and the Code has been revised twice in 2007 and 
2012 respectively. In Germany, the Government Commission on the German 
Corporate Governance Code has revised and released the national code of corporate 
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governance namely German Corporate Governance Code several times. In Hungary, 
the Budapest Stock Exchange has also revised and released the national code of 
corporate governance in the year 2007, 2008 and 2012 after the first issue of the code 
in the year 2002. There are also other codes of corporate governance that only target a 
specific group of players in the market. Such codes include the Principles for 
Responsible Institutional Investors, or Japan’s Stewardship Code which was released 
by the Financial Services Agency, and the Corporate Governance Code for Collective 
Investment Schemes and Management Companies which was released by Irish Funds 
Industry Association. In sum, the intervention of both the governing and non-
governing bodies have largely driven the reforms of corporate governance (Zalewska, 
2014), through their roles in improving the corporate governance system (Kim and Lu, 
2013). 
Corporate governance code revisions are essential in order to update the firms 
regarding the best governance practices that are parallel with the changing market 
expectation. The changing market expectation on new corporate ethos may be due to 
the shift in financial market structure, such as the increased in blockholders and 
institutional investors (Schmeling, 2007). This group of investors have high financial 
literacy skills and their increasing presence may require better corporate governance 
standard. For example, in the King II Report released in 2002 in South Africa, it has 
documented that institutional investors require additional measurements to enable 
them to judge stewardship, performance, conformance, and sustainability on a 
common basis (King II Report, 2002). In addition, an increasing number of foreign 
investors due to the advance in financial technology development may place a greater 
pressure on policy makers with respect to upgrading the local firms’ corporate 
governance so that it is comparable to the international requirements. Hence, corporate 
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governance code revisions are essential so that the local firms can keep updated about 
the new practices of governance with accordance to the constant change in market 
expectations. 
Corporate governance code revisions are prevalent in many countries. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, the first code of corporate governance, The Cadbury 
Report was released in 1992. The Cadbury Code was then replaced by a newer issue 
in year 2003, namely The Combined Code. It was then revised again in the year 2006, 
2008 and 2009 respectively. In order to meet the changing environment due to the new 
Listing Regime, which was introduced in 2010, the U.K. Financial Reporting Council 
released a new code of corporate governance namely The UK Corporate Governance 
Code in the year 2010. It was then revised in 2012 and 2014. In Singapore, the 
Singapore Ministry of Finance has revised the Code of Corporate Governance in the 
year 2005, four years after the first issue; the Code was then revised again in the year 
2012. In developing country such as Malaysia, the first release of Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance was in the year 2000; the Code was then revised in 2007 and 
2012 respectively. In Thailand, the Stock Exchange of Thailand released the first code 
of corporate governance, namely The SET Code of Best Practices for Directors of 
Listed Companies in the year 1998, and made a series of revisions in the year 1999, 
2002, 2006, and 2012 respectively.  
The national code of corporate governance, for example, in Malaysia, has 
shown the evolution in the aim of corporate governance required by the changing 
market expectation through corporate governance code revisions. In the release of the 
revised code of corporate governance in the year 2012 (i.e. the MCCG 2012), the new 
recommendations in the revised code has informed the firms with regard to the creation 
of a corporate governance model that promotes sustainable growth, imitating the trend 
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in the major markets (Elkington, 1998). Also, the MCCG 2012 recommends an 
additional responsibility of the board of directors regarding monitoring the adoption 
of sustainable strategic decision making in a firm. The example has shown that 
corporate governance code revisions are essential to promote the practices of 
governance which is parallel with the current market expectation.  
Corporate governance code revisions also aim to increase the degree of 
acceptance by the majority of the firms. For example, in the U.S., the first release of 
the code of corporate governance namely Cadbury Report in 1992 recommends the 
U.S. firms to send shareholders a brief summary of points raised at the annual general 
meeting (Financial Reporting Council and London Stock Exchange, 1992, p48). 
However, the cost of such practice, either by a separate mailing or included in the next 
financial report circulated to shareholders, will be borne entirely by the firms. The cost 
is considered high especially for the minority shareholders. Hence, the appropriateness 
of the new practice to the U.S. firms has raised a doubt. In the revised code namely the 
Hampel Report released in 1998, the recommendation has been amended. The new 
recommendation in the Hampel Report suggests that the firms will sent the summary 
of points raised at the annual general meeting only when it is requested by the 
shareholders, as a matter of the best practice (Hampel Report, 1998). In general, 
corporate governance code revisions are desirable in order to correct the inappropriate 
recommendations on governance practices, while taking into account the changing 
legal institutional structure, as well as the new expectations from the shareholders and 
stakeholders on the role of corporate governance (Belgian Corporate Governance 
Committee, 2009). 
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In fact, the most fundamental aim of corporate governance code revisions is to 
reduce the agency cost and to increase the firm value for shareholders. In reviewing 
the code of corporate governance from France released in 2002, namely Promoting 
Better Corporate Governance in Listed Companies, the Code documents that the aim 
of the revision is not merely to improve moral imperative, but also serves as a key 
driver for economic growth, while considering for business competence and the 
performance of the financial market. Similarly, the largest American public pension 
fund called the California Public Employee’s Retirement System (CalPERS), 
highlights that corporate governance is value relevant, but it does not aim to change 
the political or social environment (CalPERS, 1999). There are several supportive 
cases that can provide proofs regarding the importance of associating corporate 
governance code revisions to firm value. First, corporate scandals such as the case of 
Bernie Ebbers, the CEO of WorldCom, who allows a $11 billion accounting fraud to 
occur, results in the loss of $180 billion of shareholder value when the stock prices 
plummeted (BBCNews, 2005). Second, the case of Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, 
the former CEOs of Enron, are both convicted of fraud and conspiracy that eventually 
led to the bankruptcy of Enron (The New York Times, 2006). Both cases have shown 
the close relationship between corporate governance and firm value. Therefore, in 
order to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance code revisions, firm value 
should be emphasized. Consistently, Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) highlight 
the need to investigate the impact of releasing new codes of corporate governance 
towards the economic value of the firms. 
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The previous studies also show evidence that every single aspect of corporate 
governance significantly affect firm value. For example, Yermack (1996), Black and 
Kim (2012), and Ooi, Hooy and Ahmad Puad (2015) show a significant link between 
the board structure and firm value; Nenova (2003) and Chi (2005) show a significant 
link between the shareholder rights and firm value; Mehran (1995) and Palia (2001) 
show a significant link between the compensation policy and firm performance as well 
as firm value. The link between corporate governance and firm value can be explained 
by agency theory in such a way that the cost of agency will be greatly reduced when 
corporate governance functions optimally in maximizing shareholder value as well as 
firm value. Therefore, the national codes of corporate governance have always 
provided recommendations on the best practices of governance from all possible 
aspects to the firms, including the practices on board structure and board function, 
remuneration or compensation, and the shareholder rights protection.  
With the exception of the U.S., the majority of the national codes of corporate 
governance are not the hard laws, but they are rather the soft laws which allow for 
voluntarily compliance. In other words, the majority of the national codes of corporate 
governance are not mandated by laws. With non-mandatory codes of corporate 
governance, it has several advantages. First, the non-mandatory codes are flexible to 
amend. Second, the non-mandatory codes can be easily revised based on the market 
mechanism for evaluation in case of deviances without to have undergoing the 
complicated legal processes. Similarly, the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance emphasizes the importance of issuing a non-mandatory code of corporate 
governance with the aim to fill the weaknesses of the rigid corporate governance legal 
systems. The benefits of not mandating the codes of corporate governance have been 
highlighted in some national codes of corporate governance. For example, The 2009 
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Belgian Code on Corporate Governance released by Belgian Corporate Governance 
Committee highlights that the Code provides higher flexibility than hard law due to 
the continuous changes in business practices and the needs of corporate stakeholders. 
The Belgian Code even documents that policy makers can swiftly anticipate such 
changes and formulate recommendations for appropriate actions under non-mandatory 
implementation of the Code (Belgian Corporate Governance Committee, 2009). 
The comply-or-explain and freedom with accountability principles form the 
foundations of non-mandatory compliance. It means that, the firms can choose to adopt 
the corporate governance practice recommendations that are suitable and appropriate 
for them only. However, even though the firms have the flexibility to comply with 
some recommendations but not all, but the firms also face pressure which is exerted 
by the investors upon requiring them to justify for the non-compliance. That is why 
the codes of corporate governance are considered as a soft law to the firms (Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 2009). The investors’ pressure put on the firms is critical 
to ensure that the firms do not simply incorporating the recommendations in the codes 
for the sake of meeting the market expectation. Understanding that there is no such 
thing as a one-size-fit-all compliance, the recent issue of the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance emphasizes that the principle of voluntarily compliance is 
effective to improve the standard of corporate governance. On the other hand, a rigid 
corporate governance law will restrict the firms in adopting the best corporate 
governance structure innovatively when its governing structure is not suitable to fit to 
the new governance practices. In such case, firm value cannot be optimized because 
the firms are forced under the legal law to comply with the new practices which may 
not be suitable to their governance settings.   
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Under non-mandatory national codes of corporate governance, Goncharov et 
al. (2006) consistently show that investors in the market played an important 
disciplinary role in monitoring firms’ compliance with the recommendations in the 
codes of corporate governance. Investors may penalize the firms for unreasonable non-
compliance through lowering the valuation of the firms’ stock prices. Therefore, it 
creates a capital market pressure for the firms to comply with the code of corporate 
governance. This may increase the competition between firms in advertising their 
compliance to the investors as a way to increase their stock valuation. As such, the 
investors should be intelligent in evaluating whether the firms have adopted the 
recommendations on corporate governance in a wise manner that can optimize the 
firms’ corporate governance functioning.  
Research regarding the issues of the codes of corporate governance is relatively 
new in the literature, but it is increasingly gaining the attention of scholars (Cuomo et 
al., 2016). The reason why the research on the codes of corporate governance is 
immature is because the interval between the release of the initial version of the 
national codes of corporate governance until the present day is relatively short. This is 
because dissemination of transnational codes of corporate governance to the world has 
only started to gain momentum after year 2004, which is the timeline after the dotcom 
bubble and various high profile corporate scandals like Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat. 
The turbulence in financial markets only triggers the introduction of national codes of 
corporate governance in many countries. Within a short interval of time since the first 
issue of the codes in the majority countries, corporate governance code revisions may 
have only happened two to three times. Hence, the data on corporate governance code 
revisions is not sufficient to initiate researches prior to this. However, Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) and a recent study by Cuomo et al. (2016) have suggested the 
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potential area of study on the codes of corporate governance. The recent empirical 
study conducted by Fauver et al. (2017) on board reforms due to the corporate 
governance code revision may give an impetus to the future studies looking into this 
area of research.    
Due to the lack of data on corporate governance code revisions in the earlier 
years, the majority of the previous studies tend to look into the effect from the release 
of a code of corporate governance to the firms, but those studies could not highlight 
the effect of continuously releasing several revised codes of corporate governance to 
the firms. The studies by Chen et al. (2011), Dahya, McConnell, and Travolas (2002) 
and Dedman (2002) show that the degree of compliance with a specific code of 
corporate governance brings significant changes in the governance practices such as 
board structure, CEO turnover, and earnings management. Another group of scholars 
(including Goncharov et al. (2006), Talaulicar and Werder (2008), and Reddy, Locke 
and Scrimgeour (2010)) shows that the degree of compliance with a specific code of 
corporate governance is significantly related to firm value or firm performance. 
Nonetheless, the literature has little evidence to prove the effect of progressive 
corporate governance code revisions on firms.  
With that, this study is motivated to investigate the effectiveness of progressive 
corporate governance code revisions. As previous studies and the national codes of 
corporate governance highlighted the importance of associating corporate governance 
with the economic value of firms, thus, this study intends to assess the effectiveness 
of corporate governance code revisions by looking at how code revisions affect the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm value. This research could 
provide a new insight at how continuous revising the codes of corporate governance 
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affects the firms’ corporate governance practices in generating higher value to the 
firms. Hence, this study fills the gap in the literature on this research issue. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
“£2bn wiped off Tesco's value as profit overstating scandal sends shares 
sliding – as it happened” – the scandal of Tesco in year 2014 following the discovery 
that its profits has been artificially inflated by £250 million (Wearden, 2014). This 
incident of Tesco revealed the weaknesses of corporate governance in the organization. 
The head of its Digital Transformation Training, Antony Welfare, pointed out the 
weaknesses of Tesco’s corporate governance from two perspectives: (1) the failure of 
the chairman and non-executive directors to monitor false reporting; (2) the failure of 
the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer to sense the unusual 
reporting prior to its disclosure (Antony Welfare, 2014). The misconducts of the board 
of directors and CEO revealed the weaknesses of the corporate governance system.  
Besides that, Forbes - an America business magazine owned by Forbes Inc., 
has also been embroiled in a scandal in 2011. Dubbed as the top corporate governance 
news of 2011, there were criticisms on Rupert Murdoch’s management style, its 
dominancy in controlling over director’s election, and other matters pertaining to 
shareholder vote. Corporate governance scandals also happen in East Asian countries. 
For example, the criticism on Olympus – a Japanese camera-maker, on the failure of 
its board of directors to effectively provide independent oversights on behalf of its 
shareholders, contributed towards the payment of advisory fees of more than a third of 
the value of the deal to two financial companies (Nathaniel, 2011).  Other than that, 
there are also the shocking corporate scandals such as corporate collapse (e.g. Enron), 
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undue profit boosting (e.g. WorldCom), managerial corporate looting (e.g. Tyco), 
audit fraud (e.g Arthur Andersen) has also happened in the U.S. - the world’s largest 
economy and a country with a well-developed legal system.  
In response to these corporate governance scandals, the U.S. government has 
stepped-in to be involved in the development of corporate governance system. For 
example, the U.S. president implemented the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and made it a law 
in August 2002. The Act aims to strengthen the corporate governance system and 
minimize corporate failures. Intervention of the U.S. government has led to an 
advancement in the development of corporate governance. Following the corporate 
governance reformation due to the intervention of third parties, the national codes of 
corporate governance have been released in parallel with the international corporate 
governance code and principles. As the majority of the national codes of corporate 
governance are not mandated by law, it aims to compensate the weaknesses of a rigid 
legal corporate governance framework. Non-mandatory compliance with the codes of 
corporate governance raises the doubt on the effectiveness of releasing the codes of 
corporate governance to substantively improve the standard of corporate governance. 
The doubt is even significant when numerous corporate governance scandals have 
been occurred. 
This study raises a doubt on the effectiveness of releasing the national codes of 
corporate governance by questioning the appropriateness of the new recommendations 
added in the revised code of corporate governance. In fact, corporate governance code 
revisions should improve the quality of recommendations on governance practices 
which are able to fit to the majority of the local publicly listed firms’ governing settings. 
It is unknown whether code issuers take into consideration of the capability of the local 
firms in complying with the governance practice recommendations. Local firms may 
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face issues regarding cost of compliance, and the inadequate facilities to complement 
to the new governance practices; these issues may hamper the incorporation of the new 
practices into the local firms. For example, due to inappropriate recommendations on 
new governance practices, firms in the U.S. complain that the cost of compliance 
outweighs the benefits; the recommendations on certification of financial statements 
by the chief executive officer and chief financial officer, as well as the expectation on 
internal control assessments have raised the average estimated cost of first-year 
implementation for large firms by $35 million. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be a 
costly example on how the many are paying for the mistake of the few. The example 
showed that the revision of the national codes of corporate governance need to take 
into account the capability of the firms in the market in adopting the new practices, as 
well as its cost of compliance - which may include transaction costs associated with 
greater disclosure such as the cost of changing company charters, restructuring, 
nominating committees and disseminating financial information to increase corporate 
transparency. High cost of compliance may lead to a decrease in shareholders’ value 
(Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009).  
There is a recommendation in the German corporate governance code 
regarding the installation of webcast during shareholder meetings, and the process of 
nomination of the board of committees. However, this recommendation is less 
applicable to small-sized firms because it increases the financial burden of the firms 
complying with it (Werder et al., 2005). Nonetheless, if firms choose to not complying 
with the recommendation, they may also face lower stock valuation by investors who 
might prefer the other firms that have complied with the recommendations. This 
creates an unhealthy environment for the firms because the firms have to compete with 
each others for obtaining good valuation from the investors through complying with 
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the recommendations on corporate governance practices even when the 
recommendations are unsuitable to the organization. This does not only depart from 
the principle of comply-and-explain, but also increases the incentive for symbolic 
compliance through box-ticking approach in order to avoid penalization by the 
investors for non-compliance.  
The lack of empirical evidence raises the question regarding the efforts of 
progressive corporate governance code revisions are able to substantively improve the 
standard of corporate governance. By reviewing several national codes of corporate 
governance, this study finds that, prior to the release of the revised codes, usually, the 
issuers will set-up a committee to review and identify the weaknesses of the previous 
recommendations through several ways like surveys and group discussions with the 
professionals. In fact, the teams involved in the revision process may conduct in-depth 
survey with the firms to identify the weaknesses of the previous recommendations. 
After that, there will be a survey in order to introduce new recommendations on 
governance practices that will be widely accepted by the local firms. Nonetheless, due 
to limited empirical evidence as shown in the literature, it is not known whether the 
effort of revising the code of corporate governance has been performed in the right 
manner which could improve the degree of compliance with the recommendations in 
the code of corporate governance.  
The news on corporate scandals raises another possibility that the past 
corporate governance code revisions do not have a balanced development on every 
single aspect of corporate governance, and hence, causes corporate governance issues 
to remain unsolved. It may be the situation of where the issuers merely focus on 
updating the board function and board structure, but less emphasizing on improving 
the recommendations on executive compensations, as well as the other aspects of 
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governance. If the focus of corporate governance code revisions only falls on the 
specific area of governance, it may be less effective to enhance the firms’ overall 
standard of corporate governance.   
For non-mandatory codes of corporate governance, investors in the market play 
an important role to ensure that firms comply with the governance recommendations 
in the codes of corporate governance. However, if the market has limited investors 
with high financial literacy skills, then the investors may have failed in its monitoring 
role towards the firms’ practices of governance whether are parallel with the 
recommendations in the codes of corporate governance. Hence, due to limited 
evidence in the literature, the capability of the investors to pinpoint whether the firms 
comply substantively with the code are questionable. Besides that, the investors could 
be very tolerant towards the firms that generate a good return of investment but failed 
in complying with the code of corporate governance. This may hamper the 
incorporation of the best practices of governance to the firms.  
Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) gives the notion that the incorporation of new 
governance practices was more than driven by legitimation reasons rather than driven 
by the initiation of the firms in the matter of compliance. Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) 
raises the concern regarding the lack interest of the firms to restructure its existing 
corporate governance practices. The firms may tend to comply symbolically with the 
code only to fulfill the market expectations. In other words, firms may comply with 
the new governance practices through box-ticking rather than adopting the practices 
in the substance form. This is shown by the study of Ananchotikul, Kouwenberg and 
Phunnarungsi (2010) that provide evidence regarding symbolic compliance with the 
Thai code of corporate governance. Therefore, measuring the degree of compliance is 
not sufficient to show the effectiveness of a corporate governance code revision. Even, 
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due to the compliance with the national codes of corporate governance is not mandated 
by laws, the firms can find the other alternatives to justify to shareholders. This 
prevents the firms to be penalized by the investors if the investors do not investigate 
whether the justification is reasonable.  
In sum, the incessant corporate scandals indicate that there are loopholes in the 
corporate governance system. The doubt on the effectiveness of corporate governance 
code revisions is an issue that should be looked with concern. The lack empirical 
evidence in the literature has failed to prove that the world’s code issuers are working 
in the correct manner in revising the recommendations in the codes of corporate 
governance. Also, the literature could not provide any view on whether progressive 
corporate governance code revisions are able to substantively improve the firms’ 
corporate governance. The problem on the capability of investors to detect the firms’ 
symbolic compliance may be a serious concern in implementing the non-mandatory 
code of corporate governance. All these problems regarding corporate governance 
code revisions may raise the doubt to the effectiveness of corporate governance code 
revisions. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
(1) Do the cumulative number of corporate governance code revisions 
significantly moderate the relationship between corporate governance score 
and firm value? 
 
(2) Do the number of new practices released in each corporate governance code 
revision significantly moderate the relationship between corporate governance 
score and firm value? 
 
(3) Do the years of compliance with a code of corporate governance significantly 
moderates the influence of the number of new practices on the relationship 
between corporate governance score and firm value? 
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1.5 Objectives 
Overall, this study aims to investigate the moderating effect of corporate 
governance code revisions towards the relationship between corporate governance 
score and firm value. The specific objectives of this study are:  
(1) To investigate the moderating effect of the cumulative number of corporate 
governance code revisions towards the relationship between corporate 
governance score and firm value. 
 
(2) To investigate the moderating effect of increasing the number of new 
governance practices released in each corporate governance code revision 
towards the relationship between corporate governance score and firm value. 
 
(3) To investigate the moderating effect of the years of compliance on the 
influence of increasing the number of new governance practices towards the 
relationship between corporate governance score and firm value.  
 
 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
The importance of investigating the effectiveness of corporate governance 
code revisions is supported by the increasing number of national codes of corporate 
governance in the world. The European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) shows 
that the number of national codes of corporate governance has increased from a total 
of 72 issues by 24 countries in year 1999 (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004) to a 
total of 189 issues by 63 countries in 2008 (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). This study 
further updates the statistics; this study finds that the number of countries issuing the 
national codes of corporate governance has increased to nearly 100 up to the year 2015. 
The increasingly high number of countries releasing the national codes of corporate 
governance has caught the attention of scholars to look into this research area. As 
documented by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), the Journal of Corporate 
Governance: An International Review has recently published 14 articles that are 
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related to the issues of the national codes of corporate governance and a total of 59 
articles mentioned about “governance code” in the abstract of their respective 
manuscripts.  
The governance practices recommended by each national code of corporate 
governance may not be exactly similar because the recommendations need to fit to the 
local institutional norms and organization cultures. However, the majority of the 
national codes of corporate governance share identical scopes of governance (Gregory, 
2000; 2001), such as in the aspects of board structure and board function, shareholder 
rights protection, and the executive compensation policy. Among the shared scopes of 
corporate governance, the practices recommended to the local firms in individual 
countries are different. Hence, there could be a limitation of studying only a single 
country sample in research because the findings could not be generalized. As such, it 
motivates the present study to look into the cross-country sample which is rarely 
investigated by the previous studies, while controlling for country-specific effect in 
the analysis. 
This study investigates the effectiveness of corporate governance code 
revisions by associating the effect of corporate governance code revisions to market-
based firm value. Tobin’s Q is chosen in the analysis as it is less biased if compared to 
the stock prices. Associating corporate governance code revisions with firm value will 
reveal how investors value the firms based on their compliance with the codes of 
corporate governance. 
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Instead of testing the direct effect of corporate governance code revisions on 
firm value, this study tends to show how corporate governance code revisions affect 
firms’ corporate governance practices, which will subsequently impact firm value. In 
other words, this study shows whether corporate governance code revisions are able 
to moderate the relationship between corporate governance score and firm value. The 
corporate governance score is collected from ASSET4ESG database. The regression 
models of this study are constructed to examine the interaction effect of corporate 
governance code revisions with corporate governance score. This is different from the 
regression model constructed by Fauver et al. (2017) which only tests the direct 
relationship between the corporate governance reforms and firm value, without 
looking into the changes of corporate governance practices of the firms in the reforms. 
Hence, the findings generated from the present study could add to the body of literature 
on corporate governance code revisions.  
The is a void in the existing literature regarding the effectiveness of progressive 
effects of corporate governance code revisions. The present literature only reveals the 
degree of compliance with a code of corporate governance that is released at one point 
in time, but there is limited evidence to show the progressive effectiveness of corporate 
governance code revisions. Hence, this study fills the research gap by investigating the 
effect of progressive corporate governance code revisions using time series data. In 
this stream of research, the concern raised by Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) regarding 
symbolic compliance should be taken into account. However, the majority of the 
investors may not be able to detect symbolic compliance in the short interval of time 
because they are not involving in the management of the firms. Hence, utilizing time 
series data that covers more than one corporate governance code revision occurs within 
the sample period of this study may generate the findings that can add to the body of 
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the literature. The rationale is that, time series data can reveal the overall effect of 
corporate governance code revisions on firm value that may be negative instead of 
expecting the effect is positive. With that, this study examines the effect of cumulative 
number of corporate governance code revisions on the relationship between corporate 
governance score and firm value. The cumulative number of corporate governance 
code revisions is able to reflect the historical activity of corporate governance code 
revisions until the present day. Also, the cumulative number of corporate governance 
code revisions are able to reveal the effect of progressive corporate governance code 
revisions on firm value throught the regressions. 
In the corporate governance code revisions, besides of the matter of compliance, 
the new governance practices are similarly important in driving the effectiveness of 
corporate governance code revisions. Rather than assessing the content of the new 
governance practices released from corporate governance code revisions, this study 
examines the quantity of new governance practices released in each corporate 
governance code revision to the relationship between corporate governance score and 
firm value. In fact, the quantity of new governance practices can affect the overall 
effectiveness of corporate governance code revisions. The rationale is that, the quantity 
of new governance practices released may have direct relationship with the cost of 
compliance, because an increasing number of new governance practices raises the cost 
of compliance. Incurring a high cost of compliance due to numerous new governance 
practices released may increase the incentive of symbolic compliance. In such cases, 
the number of new governance practices are investigated.  
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Given the cost of compliance is a concern in non-mandatory codes of corporate 
governance, it is also critical to measure the average cost of compliance per year 
besides the total cost of compliance incurred for adopting the new governance 
practices. The rationale is that, releasing numerous new governance practices at one 
time may incur a lower cost of compliance per year (when averaged) because it is 
usually done by the countries that do not frequently revise the national code of 
corporate governance. In other words, when dividing the number of years of 
compliance with the number of new governance practices released, the average cost of 
compliance may not be high. Thus, instead of only examining the number of new 
governance practices, inclusion of the number of years which allows for firms to 
compliance with the new practices are also critical. In fact, there are some countries 
that revise their national codes of corporate governance every one or two years, while 
certain countries revise their national codes less frequently, and some countries have 
no constant interval in their code revision. The heterogeneity of the years of 
compliance create the value of research.  
In summary, this study shows several significance. First, the research gap in 
the literature is filled through revealing the effectiveness of progressive corporate 
governance code revisions. This study focuses on the effect of a series of corporate 
governance code revisions rather that a specific code revision. Second, this study uses 
the world sample to generalize the findings. Third, this study do not test the direct 
effect of corporate governance code revisions towards firm value, but this study looks 
into the effect of corporate governance code revisions to the firms’ corporate 
governance practices which subsequently affect firm value. Fourth, this study 
investigates the effectiveness of corporate governance code revisions from three new 
perspectives, i.e. the cumulative number of code revisions, the number of new 
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practices released in each revision, and the years of compliance with each revised code 
of corporate governance. These are the significance of this study that adds value to the 
literature as well as policy makers.  
 
1.7 Contribution of the Study 
This study contributes to the literature by showing the overall effectiveness of 
corporate governance code revisions to the changes of the firms’ corporate governance 
practices which subsequently affect firm value. The findings of this study are able to 
reveal whether corporate governance code revisions that cause a change in the firms’ 
governance practices is substantive or symbolic. If the increased of corporate 
governance score following the corporate governance code revisions does not improve 
firm value, it should indicate the suspicious regarding symbolic compliance. The 
findings are able to show whether firms tend to symbolically comply with the code 
only to fulfill the market expectation, but intend to retain the loopholes in corporate 
governance to safeguard the benefit of the decision makers in the firms rather than 
sharing the benefit to all of the stakeholders in fairly mood, or vice versa. Hence, the 
findings are able to add to the body of literature regarding the response of the firms 
when confronting with the need to restructure the internal governance mechanism. The 
findings could also provide useful implication to justify whether agency theory or 
institutional theory is predominant in this context. This may also give a policy 
implication on whether implementing non-mandatory codes of corporate governance 
is a wise decision by the policy makers.     
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The main findings of this study could justify institutional theory regarding the 
emphasis on legitimacy with respect to the issue of low degree of compliance with the 
non-mandatory codes of corporate governance. Amid the limited empirical studies on 
corporate governance code revisions, this study provides the evidence to state the 
importance of institutional theory in explaining the development of non-mandatory 
codes of corporate governance. The support for institutional theory may highlight the 
importance of forming a norm in corporate governance institutional setting. The norm 
can exert pressure to the firms that fail in complying with the code of corporate 
governance. Because limited studies provide empirical evidence to highlight the 
importance of legitimacy in the matter of compliance with the codes, this study adds 
value to the literature in supporting the standpoint of the institutional theory. 
The effectiveness of corporate governance code revisions can justify for the 
importance of soft laws in pressuring firms for complying with the non-mandatory 
codes of corporate governance. The findings will be able to signal the important role 
played by the investors in monitoring the firms’ compliance with the codes of 
corporate governance. The findings may shed light the additional role played by the 
investors in penalizing the firms for the failure of compliance through stock price 
valuation (Goncharov et al, 2006). For example, investors should give lower valuation 
to the firms that have failed in complying with the recommendations on corporate 
governance without a reasonable justification. Investors should intellingently invest in 
the firms which possesses a sound corporate governance system only, rather than 
investing in the firms which possesses a poor corporate governance system. This 
creates a strong pressure to the firms with weak governance because they may have 
less accessibility to external financing. Hence, the investors play a significant role in 
creating a healthy competition for the firms in the financial market.             
